Ab.rimct--It is a commonly held belief that IPv6 provides greater security against random-scanning worms by virtue of a very sparse address space. We show that an intelligent worm can exploit the directory and naming services necessav for the functioning of any network, and we model the behavior of such a worm in this paper. We explore via analysis and simulation the spread of [6] worms amply demonstmed the effectiveness of this brute force technique in spreading at time scales that do not permit human reaction and make automated reaction vey difficult. Arguably, the effectiveness of random scanning owes to the fact that IPv4 a d h s s e s are only 32 bits long, thus allowing for an fast exhaustive search of all possible hosts, and the relative population (host) density in this space.
Ab.rimct--It is a commonly held belief that IPv6 provides greater security against random-scanning worms by virtue of a very sparse address space. We show that an intelligent worm can exploit the directory and naming services necessav for the functioning of any network, and we model the behavior of such a worm in this paper. We explore via analysis and simulation the spread of such worms in an IPv6 Internet Our results indicate that such a worm can exhibit propagation speeds comparable to an D? random-scanning worm. We develop a detailed analytical model that reveals the relationship between network parameters and the spreading rate of the worm in an Ipv6 world. Wc also develop a simulator based on our analytical model. Simulation results based on parameters chosen from real measurements and the current Internet indicate that an intelligent worm can spread surprising fast in an Ipv6 world by using simple strategies. The performance of the worm depends heavily on these strategies, which in turn depend on how secure the directory and naming services of a network are. As a result, additional work is needed in developing detection and defense mechanisms against future worms, and our work identifies directory and naming services as the natural place to do it.
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I. IXTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Internet has been plagued by a number of worms 113, 123, [3] , [4] . Many of these worms use m d o m address scanning to identify new hosts to infect. The Slammer [5] and Witty [6] worms amply demonstmed the effectiveness of this brute force technique in spreading at time scales that do not permit human reaction and make automated reaction vey difficult. Arguably, the effectiveness of random scanning owes to the fact that IPv4 a d h s s e s are only 32 bits long, thus allowing for an fast exhaustive search of all possible hosts, and the relative population (host) density in this space.
Following this reasoning. it is natural to expect that the a-entual adoption of IPv6 [7] will affect the propagation speed of scanning worms. In particular, the 128-bit IF+6 addresses should make it considerably more "It for a worm to find new targets through random selection. Assuming that the total number of hosts on the Intemet does not increase by a similar factor. the work factor for finding a target in an Our anafytical models indicate that the spread of such DNSbased worms is greatly influenced by the variance of the fractions of hosts currently infected in various subnetworks. The higher the variance. the slower is the growth, Thus, a fastspreading worm should spread out as uniformly as possible across different subnets, and lmce it needs an effective strategy for identifying vulnerable hosts in different subnets. Our results also demonstrate that the speed of spread depends to a great extent on the strategy employed in locating additional targets within a network once a host has been infected. Hence, security should be tightened against strategies that allow easy or unauthorized access to valid IPv6 addresses in a local network.
Thus, we believe that further reseatch is needed in developing mechanisms €or detecting and responding to fastspreading worms. One natural initial counter-measure to the "DNS worm" is to install anomalp detection capabilities close to DNS servers. This will help in identfiing likely worm infestations by measuring the rate at which hosts generate DNS queries, although it is unllkely to eliminate the worm problem by itself. Wble the scenario that we study in this paper concerns DNS and IP addresses, the general principles apply to ans situation where "targets" are identified by employing a directoq or search service. We hope that our work will incentnize additional work in the area of worm detection and countermeasures.
Paper Organization: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 11 gives a brief background on the DNS infrastructure, along with a simple analytical model for the cost of queries. Section 111 discusses the DNS worm, and modeIs its propagation speed. Section IV briefly describes the simulator we use in Section V, which contains our results on projected worm propagation using both mathematical models and the DNS worm simulator. Section VI discusses related work on worm detection and defenses. We conclude the paper with Section VII.
BACKGROUND ON DNS
DNS provides a mapping from alphabetical domain names to the numerical IP addresses used to identlfy hosts in the Internet. The DNS architecture is a hierarchy of distributed 'hame-servers" that contain databases of name-to-LP mappings. In a typical DNS quey, a client needs to obtain the IP address for a distant host it needs to contact It first contacts the local "resolver", a DNS server in the same domain as the client. This resolver then contacts one of the root name-semen that are at the top of the DNS hierarchy. The resolver is then recursiveIy referred to a succession of name-servers down the hierarchy until it queries the authoritative name-server for the hostname to be resolved. The authoritative name-server then replies to the local resolver with the required IP address. The local resolver then sends it to the client and also caches a copy for immediate retrieval in case of further queries for the same hosmme from a client in the domain for which it is the local resolver. The logical path taken by a typical DNS queT is shown in Figure 1 .
The time taken for a DNS query consists of round-trip delays between the local resolver and the client and also the round-trip delays between the local resolver and the nameservers queried. In mathematical fonn,
where is the round-trip delay between the client and the resolver and dinternet is the elapsed time behveen the time the resolver issues the DNS queq to the root name-sewer and the time it gets the response back from the authoritative nameserver. The delay dinternet, may consist of round-trip times of communication amongst multiple pairs of hosts. These mundtrip delays in turn depend on a multitude of factors:
2) Timeouts and Retransmissions: Packet losses due to congestion in the network may trigger retransmissions that increase the DNS delay. If a DNS quey packet is lost, typically the client waits for a timeout T before sending a retransmission If pl-is the loss probability (and hence the retmnsmission probability)l then the expected DNS delay for a query is ( 2 ) We assume that the local resolver resides in the same subnetwork as the client and so the delay dlocal is not much affected by the load on the DNS servers.
2,) DNS Cache HitiMiss:
The hostname to be resolved may already be present in the cache of the local resolver, in which case the DNS delay is considerably less. In essence, from the client's perspective, the DNS delay depends on (i) the Cache HitMiss probability and (ii) Congestion in the Intemet (which may S e c t the round-trip delays).
If PDCH is the probability of a DNS cache hit when resolving a hostname. then the average DNS delay may be written as
WORM PROPAGATION MODEL A. Randoni Scanning
In a typical random scanning worm (such as versions of CodeRed and Slammer worm) propagating in an rPV4 Tntemet space. each worm instance generates random IP addresses and tries to infect the host with that l P address. Various earlier works [lo] . [I 11 lave modeled this random scanning worm using a simple epidemic model. The assumption is that ay Intemet host is either vulnerable to infection or has already been infected, in which case it contributes to the worm propagation by infecting 0 t h machines. Also, once a host has been infected, it remains infected. The classical simple epidemic model is given by the equation: The fraction of infected hosts at any given time t is denoted by a ( t ) = $. The dynamics of a follow an equation similar to Equation (4).
B. The DNS Worm
The DNS Worm overcomes ths obstacle by not relying on random scanning. The DNS worm uses DNS queries to find active IP addresses in the sparse IPv6 address space. It consists of two parts. At the backend is an address generator that generates strings which might be actual hostnames on the Internet. The frontend then uses DNS resolution to find the corresponding IP address, whch is then attacked and infected if deemed vulnerable.
1) String Generation: The DNS Worm back-end consists of a string generator that generates strings which are probable names of actual hosts on the Intemet. Internet hostnames are typically made up of common words separated by dots (e.g., mww.yahoo.com). Most of the words used are dictionary words; some prefixes and s f i x e s such as "WWW" and ".corn" respectively, even though not dictionary words, are extremely common. Thus, a smart DNS Worm can use a form of dictionay attack to generate probable Intemet hostnames. Apart from dictionary-based string generation a worm can use web search engines to gather valid hostnames, and in particular server names. Still more hostnames that ive not necessarily web sewers and hence do not show up on web search engines, can be retrieved from other public access Internet locations such as Google groups. mailing lists, ecc. Recently, a variant of an email worm known as hfvDoom, harvested email addresses by sending search queries to popular web search engines as it spread [9] . This siowed the search engines considerably, in some cases totally knocking them out 1. Another worm called Sunt_ll used the search engine Google to find websites containing online bulletin boards running a wlnerable version of the widely used PHP Bulletin Board(phpBB) software. By using similar sophisticated techniques, the string generator can produce actual host addresses with lugh probability.
We denote the set of all possible strings which can be produced by the string generator as x. The subset of that are actual host addresses is denoted by x Z a r g e t , An instance of the DNS Worm that uses the string generator to produce probable host addresses and then tries to infect the valid addresses is only able to infect hosts from the set x t a r g e * . Natumlly: there are still valid Internet host addresses that lie outside x but whch cannot be produced by the suing generator and as a consequence cannot be infected. Thus, from the view of the DNS Worm, the vulnerable hosts on the Internet are only the hosts with addresses contained in string set xtargef. Hence for all analytical purposes, N = xtarget.
The DNS Worm operates by iterating'over two steps:
Generate a new probable hostname using the string generator.
Resolve the probable hostname by initiating a DNS query.
If a valid IP address is returned, it implies that there is
an actual Internet host with this m e . In this case the host is attacked and infected. The DNS quey may also result in no corresponding P address being found.
For a string produced by the string generator, the probability of it being a valid hostname is o=-x t a r g e t (5 1
x Note that we assume that all these ~~~' 9~' hosts have the vulnerability which the DNS Worm exploits. In case only some fraction of the x t a r g e t hosts have the VulnerabiIity, the parameter CT can be scaled accordingly.
2) Eflectiw Scan Rare: For each scan that the DNS Worm performs, it has to perform a DNS query and, if the query is successful, mfect the resulting IP address (if vulnerable). The total time taken in the process is the sum of the DNS delay and the infection time. On the other hand if the DNS query is unsuccessful, the worm immedmtely starts generating a new string for the next probable infection. Hence the total time is just the DNS delay. Since the DNS query was unsuccessful, the string vas not a valid hostname and hence cannot be found in the DNS Domain-Local Cache. Therefore. the average delay for such queries is d,,(a). The average delay for successful queries is d S h e d [ ( a ) + -rf where ~f is the average infection time.
Note that these delays are a function of a, the fraction of infected hosts (as defined in Section 111-A): since, as the number of infected hosts goes up, so does the DNS t d E c due to the worms and hence the load on the DNS sewers, whch in turn affects the DNS delays.
+Note that this occurred after the submission of this paper to lnfocom 2005.
As observed in Equation (5): the probability of queTing for valid hostnames (and hence of successful DNS queries) is given by ET. The effective average DNS delay for a worm then becomes
Hence the effective scan rate of the DNS worm is given by ( is the probabilip of a DNS Worm producing a string which is a valid Internet host. the number of scans (and so the number of DNS queries) that return a valid IP address are aJ6l(t). Since a fraction of the vulnemble hosts are already infected, the probability of an IP address retrieved using a DNS quev belonging io a still uninfected host is 1 -a(t).
Hence the new infections in time period 6 are queuing system. This is just a first order approximation and in no way implies that the actual Root server behavior follows the MAWlIK queuing model. The queuing system serves DNS queries and has an exponential service rate given by p, K is the Inavimum number of queries that can be present (either waiting or being served) in the queuing system at a given time. During times of high
load, not all queries can be served. Many of the queries will be dropped due to buffer exhaustion in the queuing system.
If X is the arrival rate of queries, then the probability of lhe queue llaving i queries waiting to be served is given by (9) where p is the load on the system and is given by p = ;
.
bufTer eslaustion is given by
The espected probability of a query being dropped due to
Queries are accepted in the system when the W 1 I K queue is not fill. The mean expected response time of only the accepted queries is then given by
The queq arrival rate X depends on how many hosts are sending DNS queries. The higher the number of infected hosts, the more DNS queries will be received by the name-servers. Hence X will increase with a. the fraction of infected hosts, which in turn implies that E [&] given by Equations (2) and (3).
The system of Root DNS servers is modeled as an W I / K queuing system in section 111-C. The expected response time of the queuing system for accepted queries is thus a good measure of the aterage time spent by a epical DNS queq in the Internet. Using Equation (11) we have dinternet(a) = E[X,].
The expected probabihv of a DNS queF being dropped in the MiM/l/K queuing model is a good measure of the retransmission probability of a DNS quew by the worm. Using 
given by 
E. The Two-level Model
The epidemic model of a uniform scanning worm described in III-A does not capture the behavior of many existing worms that mfferentiate the IF' addresses of the same Ipv4 subnet to a~itrary IP addresses (e.g., CodeRed2). This locality property becomes much more important in Ih.6 networks. The local Pi6 address space is already too large for a worm to perform random s c m just by guessing I P addresses. However. there are many more efficient ways to find a host in the local network. Routing protocols, Windows service location announcements, neighbor discoverq. caches, and host co Aguration and log files can be exyloited to identifv additional hosts on the local network
In the previous sections. we proposed to use nameservers to search for hosts in an IPv6 Intemet. which is much less efficient than possible methods that explore the local network. An effective Ipv6 worm has to consider the locality of the Internet and use different propagation methods: a global scan method and a local scan method. The giobal scan method is inefficient but necessary, because it can cover a large portion of the total population of the vulnerable hosts on the Internet.
The local scan method is efficient but can only discover vdnerable hosts on the Iocal network. This results in a much hgher infection rate to hosts in the local network than against a~i t r a q host on the Intemet. As a result, we use a hvo-level model to describe the propagation of an IPv6 worm.
Suppose 
IV. THE DNS WoRhf SIMULATOR
We use a simulator to analyze the pmpagation of IPv6 worms with the models in Section 111. There may be thousands to millions of vulnerable Iiosts on the Internet. so it is impossible to simulate them individually. Even if we do not consider computational complexity, it is hard to iden@ representative configurations. For this reason, we simulate each local network as a group. In our simulation, we consider the scan of each infected host as a stochastic process. The time between two scans is random and may satisfy certain distributions. We assume the scanning processes of different hosts are fairjy independent. For worms using multi-threading, we consider each thread as an independent stochastic process.
The probabilities that global and local scans from an infected host reach a certain vulnerable host are 1/fli and 1/R, respectively, and are both very small. Then, regardless of the tu^ of the infection mechanism, the stochastic process for the number of a local network is close to a Poisson process with rate R.,. due to many Bernoulli selections with small probabilities and the summation of independent processes.
With this assumption, we simulate the worm propagation by dividing the whole Internet into n counting processes that represent n local networks. Each counting process is a Poisson process with a changing rate. which is R; for the 2-th local network. We assume there is an initial population of infected hosts and denote it by I" = Cy=oIp.
V SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
In th~s section we study the propagation rates of various kinds of DNS worms based on our model in the earlier sections and the effect of various parameters.
Although the address space of IPvG is 2gs times greater than that of Wv4, the total number of hosts on an IPv6 Internet is We define hvo different types of DNS Worms. The first, referred to as DNS-Basic Worm, incurs only constant DNS delays for all its DNS queries. The other version, referred to as DNS-Advanced Worm. incurs DNS delays based on the DNS delay model described in 111-C. The Simulator uses Equation (16) to simulate the propagation of the DNS-Advanced Worm.
The DNS Worm also has parameters such as the maximum number of vulnerable machines N , which are common with earlier IPv4 worms such as Slammer and CodeRed. We refer to DNS-Slammer as the worm that has all such common parameters the same as the Slammer worm. Simdarly. the DNS-CodeRed worm has alI the common parameters the same as the CodeRed worm. This is further shown in Table I .
We can have combinations of DNS Worm characteristics. For example. DNS-Basic-Slammer is the DNS Worm with Slammer parameters and constant DNS delays.
For the simulation of the DNS-Advanced Worm we also need the values of the DNS model parameters p and K. We choose them to be p = 5 x 10*/secmd and K = 1000.
A . Comparison with IPv4 IVorms
We now examine how the DNS Worm propagates in the IPv6 Internet space. compared to earlier worms such as Slammer and CodeRed in the IPv4 Internet space. compares with that of the Slammer worm in an Ipv4 environment. The DNS-Slammer-Basic u"n (DNS Worm with Slammer parameters and constant DNS delays) is able to propagate almost as fast as the Slammer worm. The two-level DNS-Slammer-Basic worm has an additional local-subnet propagation rate that makes it extiemely fast. Thus, it is able to infect all the vulnerable hosts in as few as 20 seconds. The DNS-Slammer-Advanced worm does slow itself down due to CodeRed worm parameters for all the wonn models. It is interesting to note that the DNS-CodeRed-Basic worm now propagates much faster than the CodeRed worm. This is because CodeRed worm has a much smaller U (probability of successful scan) than DNS-CodeRed-Basic worm. The DNSCodeRed-Advanced worm still propagates much faster than the CodeRed worm. Note that the x-axis in Figure 3 is in log-scale, since' the two-level worm is much faster than other worms.
B.'. Effect of hbximum Throughput
In our DNS Worm model explained in 111, we observe that the worm propagation rate given by Equation (16) depends on the DNS arcfutecture p m e t e f i , u and K , which are respectively .the maximum throughput of DNS queries that the DNS architecture can handle and the maximum backlog for the queries that the system can hold at a given time.
In this simulation we e.xplore the effect p and K have on the propagation rate of the DNS Worm. For this purpose, we choose various values of , u and K and simulate the propagation of the DNS-Advanced worm. Figure 4 shows how p and K affect the propagation m e of the DNS-Advanced worm. with similar results and observations. As we can see, K does not have much of an impact on the propagation for worm models with the same p value.
On the other hand. increased throughput p helps the worm to propagate faster. For comparison purposes. we also show the propagation of a DNS-Basic worm that has constant DNS delays and hence does not depend on p and K values, The interesting thing to note is that the shape of the propagation curves for DNS-Advanced worm models is very different from the DNS-Basic worms. We observe a break-off point where the worm propagation suddenly slows down. Tlus is due to the saturation of the queue for the M/M/l/K queuing system described in 111-C: furthermore, the high number of queries generated by the spreadmg worm acts as a negative feedback, self-regulating the spread. Tlus points to a possible defense mechanism, limiting the throughput of the DNS servers to reach the break-off p i n t as early as possible. On the other hand, it is also likely to result in poor performance of DNS lookups for legitimate users. One possible answer is better anomaly detectors at DNS servers. Deploying them only at the root DNS servers may be sufficient, depending on their accuracy.
C. Effect of initial Variance on Propagation Rate
' Section 111-E shows that the two-level worm propagation rate is affected by the variance of number of infected. hosts in different local subnetworks. Here. we examine the effect of initial variance in the distribution of lnfected hosts in the local subnehvorks on the propagation rate of the DNS-Basic Worm. For this experiment, we set the total number of vulnerable hosts to lo8> with each local subnetwork having 104 vulnerable hosts. The local scan rate & is supposed to be 1 per second and the global scan rate 5 is 0.5 per second. We assume that the worm can efficiently discover all existing vulnerable hosts on a local subnetwork, which means 52, = Ni. For the global scanning, we set U = N/R = 1/50. Initially, the worm has already infected 1 ' = 1000 hosts. These parameters are listed in Table 11 . These 1000 hosts may be distributed in various ways amongst the 104 local subnetworks, resulting in various variance levels. Figure 6 shows the worm propagation as a function of time for different initial variance values. Note that curve (e) in Figure 6 is an analytical result for the ideal case of no variance throughout the simulation, although it is impossible for the infected hosts to be uniformly &stributed amongst the local subnetworks at all times. As we can see observe from Figure 6 , as the variance increases, the worm propagation becomes slower. Figure 7 shows the correlation of the initial variance and the time for the worm to infect 80% of the vulnerable hosts.
We can see that the initial variance of the distribution of the infected hosts in the local subnetworks has a pronounced effect on the infection time. 
D. Effect of Local Scanning Rate
The various experiments in the previous subsections show that the Two-level DNS Worm is much faster than one-level worms. This is typically due to much faster propagation rates in the local subnetworks than across networks.
We now e d n e the effect of local propagation on the overall propagation rate of the Two-level DNS-Basic worm. We use the parameter values from Table 11 . Figure 8 shows how the local scanning rate affects the total worm propagation. It is important to note that the pronounced effect of decreased local scanning rate is to prolong the initial infection period. Thus, for example, it takes much longer for the worm with smaller local scanning mte to infect 20% of the vulnemble hosts. After that. the infection proceeds pretty smoothly. albeit still slower than the corresponding worm with a higher local scanning rate.
W. RELATED WORK
Computer viruses are not a new phenomenon. and they have been studied es-ensively over the last several decades. Cohen is unlikely to significantly affect mail worm propagation.
[26] describes a design space of worm containment systems using three parameters: reaction time, containment strategy, and deployment scenario. The authors use a combination of analytic modeling and simulation to describe how each of these design factors impacts the dynamics of a worm epidemic.
Their analysis suggests that there are significant gaps in containment defense mechanisms that can be employed, and that Considerable more research (and better coordination between ISPs and other entities) is needed. In the realm of %aditiomI" computer viruses, most of the existing anti-virus techniques use a simple signature scanning approach to locate threats. As new viruses are created, so do virus signatures. Smarter virus writers use more creative techniques (e.g., polymorphic viruses) to avoid detection In response detection mechanisms become ever more elaborate, e.g., using partiaI simulation during program execution This has led to coevolution [28] , an ever-escalating arms race between virus writers and anti-virus developers.
Lin, Ricciardi, and Marzullo study how computer worms affect the availability of services. In [29] , they study the fault tolerance of multicast protocols under self-propagating virus attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we explored via analysis and simulation the spread of worms in an IPv6 Internet. We modeled and analyzed an intelligent worm that exploits DNS as a means of ideiitifving potentially vulnerable IP(v6) addresses, and uses a two-level spreading mechanism to infect other hosts. Our results demonstrate that by using simple strategies to identlfv hosts across the two levels. a DNS-based worm in Ihfi can spread as fast as a random-scanning worm in an IPv4 world.
This goes against the conlmonly held belief tlat provides inherently higher security through its larger address space.
Our model also identifies the directoq and naming senice in a network as a potential launching pad for worm attacks in a network with a sparsely populated address space. We explored WO scenarios, one in which DNS delays are constant, and another in which DNS delays grow as a function of the number of infected hosts. Experiments with the latter scenario indicate that the spread of the worm is influenced by the processing capacity of the DNS servers. If the spread of the worm results'in query volumes that can overwhelm the DNS servers. this can cause DNS senice unavailability for legttimate users and induce a denial of senlice effect. Thus, to protect future networks. DNS (or any directorq.) servers are a natural location to install anomaly detection and defense capabilities.
Another finding from our analytical model is that the variance of the fractions of hosts infected in a subnet has a big impact on the spreading rate. The more spread-out the worm starts across dfferent subnets, the faster it cin infect all vulnerable hosts. We also assume the worm has an efficient way to identj. valid IF' addresses in a local network, by using techniques like accessing routing protocols, Windows service location announcements, neighbor discovery caches, and host c o & m t i o n and log files. Our results show that if the second-layer identification mechanism can be hindered, that further sloivs down the spread of the two-level DNS worm.
In summar): directory and naming sewices, wiuch are critical to the functioning of any network, can also be exploited by intelligent worms to infect hosts, Thus, fi~ture IPv6 networks need to shore up the security of the naming and directory services to prevent the spread of such worms.
